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The Limits of Devolution in Environmental
Law: A Comparison of Regional and
Statewide Ambient Air Quality Planning in
the United States and Germany
Thomas Julian Paget
[The United States Constitution] was framed upon the
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink
or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity
and salvation are in union and not division.
-Justice Benjamin Nathan Cardozo'
A New Federalism has entered political and legal discourse
in the United States.2 According to the New Federalism, the
federal government should place the responsibility for designing
and executing many government programs squarely in the hands
of the states. This New Federalism has already begun to reshape
the relationship between the federal and state governments.3
This New Federalism does not constitute the brief of a particular
political party, but has been espoused, in different ways, by Pres-
ident Clinton, the House of Representatives, and the Senate.4
In the area of environmental law, the thrust of the New
Federalism is no less perceptible.5 Although states currently
t B.A. 1993, Harvard University; Dipl.Soz. 1996, Humbolt Universitat zu Berlin; J.D.
Candidate 1998, University of Chicago. I wish to gratefully acknowledge the invaluable
advice provided to me by Professor David P. Currie of the University of Chicago Law
School and the assistance with German legal materials provided by Markus Bolsinger and
Carsten Angersbach.
1 Baldwin v Seelig, 294 US 511, 523 (1935).
The term "New Federalism" has its origin in the policies of the Nixon and Reagan
Administrations, which under that slogan attempted to reverse the trend of governmental
centralization and to return some powers to the states. See David B. Walker, The Advent
of an Ambiguous Federalism and the Emergence of New Federalism III, 56 Pub Admin
Rev 271 (1996).
Kathleen M. Sullivan, In Defense of Federal Power; The States Are Not Strong
Enough, NY Times Magazine 37 (Aug 18, 1996); Daniel B. Wood, Size Ten State Govern-
ments Try On Size Four Wardrobes, Christian Sci Monitor 3 (Mar 13, 1996).
Walker, 56 Pub Admin Rev at 271 (cited in note 2).
Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental
Laws, 70 Tulane L Rev 2373, 2374 (1996) ("What is new in the most recent federalism
controversy is how widespread the sentiment is for devolving environmental enforcement
528 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1997:
share the power to develop and implement clean air law with the
federal government in Washington,6 the New Federalists argue
that the balance of power currently tips too heavily towards the
federal government at the expense of the states.7
In making such claims, however, the New Federalists may be
overly optimistic about states' ability to engage in regional ambi-
ent air quality planning-an important part of clean air law
necessary to avoid cross-jurisdictional externalities and other
special difficulties associated with air pollution. It is important to
understand the limits of devolution: the points at which a "race-
to-the-bottom" would cause the states to neglect statewide or
regional air pollution planning. A "race-to-the bottom" in regional
air quality planning preceded and eventually led to the passage
of the Clean Air Act of 1963,' the Air Quality Act of 1967,' and
the Clean Air Act of 1970.0 However, that historical "race-to-
the-bottom" tells us little about the proper balance of powers
between the states and federal government with regard to region-
al ambient air quality planning: not only was there little signifi-
cant federal effort to engage in regional ambient air quality plan-
ning at that time, but regional ambient air quality planning did
not yet exist for all practical purposes.1
To determine the proper balance of powers and responsibili-
ties between the states and the federal government, therefore, we
must turn elsewhere for guidance. Comparative law provides one
source of information. Other countries have comparable federal
systems in which the law divides differently the responsibility for
regional air quality planning between the states and the federal
government. The Federal Republic of Germany might be taken as
a benchmark for comparison, though it has received little atten-
tion in the United States. 2 In Germany, the federal government
powers from the federal government to the States and how dramatically the current pro-
posals would reduce the federal role.").
See Part II.
See, for example, James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental
Standards in a Federal System-and Why It Matters, 54 Md L Rev 1226 (1995).
Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392, codified as amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
Pub L No 90-148, 81 Stat 485, codified as amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
'0 Pub L No 91-604, 84 Stat 1676, codified as amended at 42 USC § 7401 et seq
(1994).
" See, for example, Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots
and Contemporary Models, 54 Md L Rev 1141, 1160-61 (1995); John P. Dwyer, The
Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md L Rev 1183, 1190-91 (1995). The
exception was the abortive attempt at regional ambient air quality planning between the
states without a federal presence, discussed in Part III.A.4.
12 Studies explicitly touching on the subject in the American legal literature include:
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leaves regional planning with respect to air pollution to the dis-
cretion of the states."3 By comparing the American and German
experiences, we can better assess the strengths and weaknesses
of the different possible ways to divide air quality regulatory
powers among states and the federal government.
This Comment begins in Part I by discussing the need for
regional planning to address the problem of ambient air pollu-
tion. In Part II, the Comment describes the clean air and admin-
istrative laws of the United States and Germany, as those laws
bear upon the matter of statewide or regional ambient air pollu-
tion planning. The Comment then goes on in Part III to describe
the problems of federalism that arise in the United States and
Germany with respect to statewide and regional ambient air
pollution planning. Finally, in Part IV, the Comment suggests
lessons to be learned from the American and German experienc-
es, presenting a paradigm for thinking about the proper division
of powers and responsibilities between federal and state govern-
ments for ensuring that such planning occurs.
Ultimately this Comment concludes that it would be difficult
to come up with better alternatives to the existing federal struc-
ture for regional ambient air quality planning in the United
States. Imperfect as it is, the Clean Air Act may best serve the
goals of federalism in the regulation of regionally significant
ambient air pollution. If regional air quality planning is to occur
within a federalist framework, it must occur within a framework
combining statewide air quality planning, federal coordination
between the several states, and federal supervision and enforce-
ment and judicial review. The Clean Air Act provides such a
framework. 4
I. THE NEED FOR REGIONAL PLANNING
The importance of regional planning in combatting air pollu-
tion often gets lost in the broader debate about clean air law and
policy. A federalist system requires regional ambient air quality
planning to deal effectively with the problem of ambient air qual-
ity. The mobility of air pollution, its cumulative effects, the mo-
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy: the Limits of Public Law in
Germany and the United States 115 (Yale 1995); David P. Currie, Air Pollution Control in
West Germany, 49 U Chi L Rev 355, 374-80 (1982).
'3 See Part II.
'4 See Part II.
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bility of polluters, and the dangers of uniformity demand such an
approach.
A. The Mobility of Air Pollution
Policymakers must find ways to deal with cross-jurisdictional
externalities. "The distribution of causes and effects over space
does not respect political boundaries." 5 Thus, a state with strict,
rigorously enforced controls on sulfur dioxide emissions may find,
nevertheless, that sulfur dioxide levels remain high, due to the
lack of controls in neighboring states. 6 In one way or another,
the air pollution policies of states must be coordinated.
B. The Cumulative Effects of Air Pollution
"Air pollution" should not be thought of as a series of partic-
ular pollutants with identical and invariable consequences. Rath-
er, air pollution has many components and leads to different
problems in diverse geographic locations. A comprehensive ap-
proach is needed, because a legal regime that regulates each
pollutant in isolation cannot effectively address the problem of
maintaining total air quality in a particular geographical area.
C. The Mobility of Polluters
Regional ambient air quality planning is a necessary conse-
quence of capital mobility. A series of excessively localized stan-
dards allows polluters to threaten governments with relocation if
such localities do not relax pollution standards. This, in turn,
triggers a "race-to-the-bottom" in which localities compete against
each other for businesses by relaxing costly laws and regulations.
Excessive devolution of responsibilities for maintaining clean air
allows localities greater opportunities for such competition. 7
Therefore, regions must be sufficiently large and have standards
comparable enough to minimize the risk that the mobility of
polluters entails. Moreover, there must be minimum national
standards to prevent regions from engaging in mutually destruc-
tive competition. 8
" Susan Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy: the Limits of Public Law
in Germany and the United States 38 (Yale 1995) ("Controlling Environmental Policy").
IS Id.
17 Id.
" See, for example, Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of Devolving Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Laws, Tulane L Rev 2373, 2376-2377 (1996); Rose-Ackerman, Controlling
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D. The Danger of Uniformity
While large regions and similar standards are necessary for
effective regional planning, these characteristics, if taken too far,
can deprive regional air quality planning of its value. Two consid-
erations support a geographically specific approach to regional
ambient air quality planning. First, a geographically specific
approach fits the geographically various nature of the problem. It
would be a mistake to hold every geographic area to the same,
uniform standards of air quality. For example, the low standards
that apply to rustbelt cities should not apply to the pristine wil-
derness areas of Alaska. The harm air pollution causes is a func-
tion of a number of different, geographically specific factors, in-
cluding "natural resource endowments, degrees of development,
human attitudes, and the size and nature of the population of
any particular area.""
Second, regional ambient air quality planning may allow
regions to function as "laboratories" for developing innovative
approaches to geographically specific air pollution problems. This
is especially likely to occur when regions have substantial discre-
tion to develop their own air quality plans.20 Without regional
innovation clean air law would suffer from excessively rigid uni-
formity, imposed without the advantage of an intimate familiari-
ty with regional conditions.
Thus, the competing considerations of effective air quality
planning and geographic specificity dictate a compromise be-
tween localized and broad-based regional air quality planning.
Environmental Policy 40-42 (cited in note 15). Note that polluters can still relocate to
foreign countries, suggesting the need for international agreements to deal with mobile
polluters.
"' James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental Standards in a Federal
System--and Why It Matters, 54 Md L Rev 1226, 1228 (1995). Taken to an extreme, of
course, the foregoing observation leads to an absurd conclusion: virtually no regional
ambient air quality planning is desirable, because significant variations will exist in any
given region except for the very smallest. But this position is impractical. Undeniably, any
regional air quality plan almost inevitably disregards highly localized variations in the
interests of providing a generalized, acceptable level of ambient air quality across an.
entire region. But if governments take a flexible, regionally-specific approach to main-
taining ambient air quality, the compromise between uniformity and regional variation is,,
on balance, a palatable one, especially in view of the other advantages of regional air
quality planning.
' See, for example, John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air
Act, 54 Md L Rev 1183, 1223 (1995) (arguing that national requirements and state discre..
tion in implementing those requirements together lead to the functioning of states asi
"laboratories").
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II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR STATEWIDE OR REGIONAL Am
QUALITY PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
Both the United States and Germany have federal systems,
in which the federal government and the several states possess
their own respective legislative, executive, and judicial institu-
tions. Regional air quality planning in the United States and
Germany functions within these federal systems. The American
and German experiences with regional air quality planning are
comparable because of the federal nature of their air quality
regimes, and because the countries themselves possess many
common characteristics: federal, representative-democratic sys-
tems of government and market-oriented, post-industrial econo-
mies. Given these similarities, examining the different approach-
es to regional air quality planning adopted by the United States
and Germany can provide valuable insight into the kinds of mea-
sures that perform well in a federal system.
A. Statewide Ambient Air Quality Planning in the United States
Under the Clean Air Act
1. The tripartite structure of the Clean Air Act: states, EPA,
citizens.
In the United States, the Clean Air Act21 creates a system
of statewide air quality plans. Under the terms of the statute, the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") sets
National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS)-maximum
levels for total emissions of specific pollutants.22 The states then
may create their own statewide air quality plans--called State
Implementation Plans ("SIPs")-to implement the NAAQS. 2
The EPA, in turn, must determine whether the SIPs fulfill
the requirements of the Clean Air Act.2' In the event of rejec-
tion, the EPA itself becomes responsible for promulgating state-
wide air quality plans-called Federal Implementation Plans
("FIPs")-for the states in question.'
The Clean Air Act also provides numerous administrative
sanctions that the EPA can apply against states that fail to sub-
mit or enforce SIPs. If states fail either to submit or enforce SIPs
2'1 42 USC § 7401 et seq (1994).
2 42 USC § 7409.
42 USC § 7410(a).
24 42 USC § 7410(cX1).
22 Id.
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in a "nonattainment area,"2 the Act requires the EPA to impose
restrictions on new construction, or to prohibit the Secretary of
Transportation from approving transportation projects or award-
ing grants, or to institute both sanctions at once. 7 In addition, if
states fail to enforce existing SIPs, the EPA can suspend the
issuance of all new or renewed permits for facilities producing air
pollution-called "stationary sources7-in nonattainment ar-
eas.' A suspension of this kind exerts a great deal of economic
pressure upon states concerned with attracting and retaining
industrial activity. Administrative sanctions are particularly
important for the EPA to function effectively, because the EPA
could not realistically fulfill its statutory responsibility to pro-
mulgate FIPs if a large number of states failed to submit and
enforce adequate SIPs. The EPA's resources are simply inade-
quate for such a cumbersome regulatory task.'
o If the EPA fails to come up with an adequate FIP of its own
or it fails to exert the requisite pressure on states to promulgate
and enforce their own SIPs, then citizens with standing can sue
the EPA in federal court to force the EPA to do so. ° Private
parties can also bring suit in federal district court to enforce the
provisions of existing SIPs or FIPs.31 These so-called "citizen
suit" provisions of the Clean Air Act are available when the state
and federal administrative agencies fail to fulfill their statutory
responsibilities. Judicial review of the EPA's actions at citizens'
behest thus provides the last line of defense against potentially
lax federal enforcement and supervision of statewide ambient air
quality planning.
2. Flexibility to allow for regional differences.
The Clean Air Act does not treat every region within a state
according to a single, inflexible set of federal standards. First, the
Act allows the EPA and state governors to designate parts of
states as Air Quality Control Regions ("AQCRs"). 2 Three kinds
' A nonattainment area is an area that does not meet national ambient air quality
standards and thus receives a temporary exemption from particular NAAQS on the
condition that the states achieve significant improvement in the air quality of the area
within a prescribed time-frame. 42 USC §§ 7501, 7407(dXl)(AXi), 7410(a)(2).
2' 42 USC § 7509(b).
42 USC § 7503(aX4).
See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md L
Rev 1183, 1203-04 (1995).
3' 42 USC § 7604.
" 42 USC § 7607.
32 42 USC § 7407.
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exist: (1) "nonattainment areas," which do not "meet or that con-
tribute[ ] to ambient air quality in a nearby area that does not
meet" the relevant NAAQSs; (2) "attainment areas" which do
meet the relevant NAAQSs; and (3) "unclassifiable areas" for
which not enough information exists to allow the EPA to catego-
rize the areas accurately as "nonattainment" or "attainment."'
In addition, the Clean Air Act accounts for differences in
regional ambient air quality between highly disparate geograph-
ical areas. The Act provides flexibility by enunciating a principle
of "Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality"
("PSD"). The PSD principle ensures that "each [SIP] shall contain
[the necessary measures] to prevent significant deterioration of
air quality in each region... designated... as attainment or
unclassifiable."' In effect, PSD prevents an attainment area
from deteriorating.
3. Dealing with cross-jurisdictional externalities.
Because the Clean Air Act provides a means for interstate
coordination of air quality planning, the legal regime it creates
addresses the need for regional planning created by cross-juris-
dictional externalities. Under the statute, the EPA can resolve
inter-jurisdictional conflicts between states by forcing neighbor-
ing states to strengthen their ambient air quality programs if the
neighboring states produce pollution that significantly impairs
ambient air quality outside of their borders. The Clean Air Act
deals with interstate air pollution in three steps by: (1) requiring
that SIPs and FIPs prohibit pollution that will contribute signifi-
cantly to air pollution in neighboring states; (2) requiring a state
to notify neighboring states of any new sources that might lead to
deterioration of their air quality; and (3) allowing the EPA to ef-
fectively arbitrate disputes between states.35
First, SIPs must "contain adequate provisions" to ensure that
a source of pollution will not "contribute significantly to
nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other
State with respect to ... national ... ambient air quality stan-
dard[s] or... interfere with measures required to be included in
[another state's SIP] ... to prevent significant deterioration of
air quality. . .
Id.
42 USC § 7471.
See notes 36-40.
42 USC § 7410(aX2XD).
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Second, the Act requires states to notify one another of any
new sources of pollution that might affect each other's air quali-
ty. Where a source of pollution in one state may produce pollu-
tion that will affect "any air quality control region outside the
State," a SIP or FIP must require that the source "provide writ-
ten notice to all nearby States the air pollution levels of which
may be affected by such source at least sixty days prior to the
date on which commencement of construction is to be permitted
by the State providing notice."37 In addition, SIPs and FIPs
must "identify all major existing stationary sources [which may
be interstate polluters] with respect to new or modified sources
and provide notice to all nearby States of the identity of such
sources ..... 3 In this way, states are notified that their own
air quality plans may be affected by particular, identified sources
of air pollution in a neighboring state.
Third, states can present such disputes to the EPA for an
administrative resolution of the conflict. If a state believes that a
source in a neighboring state is contributing, or will in the future
contribute, to a violation of its SIP, the state can petition the
EPA for a ruling." If the EPA finds a violation, the source must
comply with the neighboring state's SIP within three years on
penalty of shutting down.'
In fact, little "regional ambient air quality planning" per se
occurs in the United States. Instead, the federal government
simply coordinates the SIPs of the states. Federal coordination
ensures that SIPs meet regional air quality needs, and replaces
actual regional planning, which would require the states or the
federal government to create cumbersome special "air quality
regions."
4. Regional ambient air quality planning in historical
perspective.
In fact, the United States did attempt to engage in actual
regional ambient air quality planning. This attempt came in the
form of the "interstate compacts" provision of the Clean Air Act
of 1963."' The provision called for states to establish, by inter-
state compact, an "interstate control agency" that was to deal.
42 USC § 7426(aX).
42 USC § 7426(aX2).
42 USC § 7426(b).
0 42 USC § 7426(c).
4 § 2(c), Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392, 393, codified at 42 USC § 7405. See also 42:
USC - 7406 (interstate agencies).
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with the problem of cross-jurisdictional externalities. Unfortu-
nately, the states were unable to resolve the problem.42 Similar
attempts, like the Illinois-Indiana Air Pollution Control Commis-
sion, likewise failed, due to state unwillingness to allow real
enforcement powers to the newly-created regional bodies.43
B. Regional Ambient Air Quality Planning in Germany Under
the Federal Immission Control Act"
Germany's Federal Immission Control Act 4 -- the statute
that regulates regional ambient air quality-and its system of
judicial review and federal supervision over state implementation
differ markedly from the regional ambient air quality planning
regime in the United States. Both are weaker. The German re-
gional air quality planning regime has two characteristic fea-
tures: first, a weak federal air quality planning law and second,
an absence of effective judicial review of regional air quality
planning.
1. The highly discretionary language of the Federal
Immission Control Act.
In Germany, the Federal Immission Control Act provides for
regional air quality plans to be developed by the states. Insofar
as the Act sets federal ambient air quality standards to be imple-
mented by state ambient air quality plans, the German regime
resembles that of the United States. The plain language of the
Act has many gaps, however, leaving the states near-total discre-
tion about whether to promulgate regional air quality plans at all
and about the actual content and geographical scope of those
plans.
The first sentence of Article 47(1) of the Act, which provides
for statewide air quality plans, is deceptively unequivocal. It
states that statewide air quality plans are to function as "restora-
tion plans."4" The states must promulgate air quality plans wher-
42 David P. Currie, Air Pollution: Federal Law and Analysis § 1.10 at 10 (Callaghan
1981 & Supp 1991).
13 Id § 1.10 at 10-12.
" Translations based loosely on Gerd Winter, ed, German Environmental Law: Basic
Texts and Introduction 143-198 (Kluwer 1994).
45 (Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz-BImSchG) BGB1. I S. 880. The German term
"Immission" means the same thing as the English "ambient air quality standard". In the
interests of brevity, however, the essay leaves the term "immission" in place throughout.
4 BImSchG § 47(1), BGBI. I S. 880.
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ever maximum immissions levels have been exceeded4 7 accord-
ing to air quality analyses to be undertaken by the states in
special "investigation areas."' Maximum immissions levels are
set by regulations binding upon third parties,49 by administra-
tive regulations'0 issued by the federal government pursuant to
the Act to "protect against risks to health,"51 or by the European
Community in the form of binding resolutions. 2
The second sentence of Article 47 of the Act, however, is
highly discretionary and equivocal, blunting the clear mandate of
the first sentence. The second sentence stipulates that states
should promulgate statewide or geographically specific air quality
plans if "other harmful effects to the environment have occurred
or are to be expected due to air pollution."53 But Article 47 does
not enumerate the "other harmful effects." The plain language of
the sentence, therefore, allows significant discretion to states in
deciding whether to promulgate air quality plans. The Federal
Administrative Court has suggested that such language means
that states must promulgate air quality plans except under
"atypical circumstances."" But the Court's ruling is equally am-
biguous, because it leaves the definition of "atypical circumstanc-
es" to the state agencies implementing the law.
The provisions of Article 47 that follow are even more discre-
tionary and equivocal. The third sentence states that
[a] regional air quality plan may be promulgated to
prevent harmful effects to the environment if the maxi-
mum level immissions set by administrative order pur-
47 Id.
BImSchG § 44, BGB1. I S. 880.
" Hanns Engelhardt, Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz. Kommentar 208 (Carl
Heymanns Verlag KG 3d ed 1993) ("Kommentar").
o Id. See Part II.B.2 for a discussion of the legal significance of such regulations, as
well as for an explanation of the different kinds of regulations that exist in German ad-
ministrative law.
51 See, for example, Erste Allgemeine Vewaltungsvorschrift zum Bundes-
Immissionsschutzgesetz (Technische Anleitung zur Reinhaltung der Luft-TA-Luft), GMBL.
S. 95, ber, S. 202 (federal administrative order setting forth a comprehensive list of
regulated air pollutants as well as maximum allowable immissions values); Richtlinie
7517161EWG des Rates zur Angleichung der Rechtsvorschriften der Mitgliedstaaten uber
den Schwefelgehalt bestimmter flilssiger Brennstoffe, ABI. 1975 L 307/22, geAnd am 3.4.
1987, ABI L 91/19 und am 31.12.1991, AB1 L 377/48 (setting forth European Community-
wide standards for the allowable sulfur immissions from certain flammable materials).
52 BImSchG § 47(1), BGBI. I S. 880.
5 Id.
5 BVerwGE 16, 224, See also Hans D. Jarass, Bundes-Immissionsschutzgesetz
(BlmSchG). Kommentar 582 n 4 (Verlag CH Beck 2d ed 1993) ("Kommentar").
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suant to this law or by binding resolutions of the Euro-
pean Community are exceeded, or the air pollution
could prove detrimental to the uses of the area provided
for in zoning and planning ordinances.55
Language such as "could prove detrimental to the uses of the
area" gives states a broad license in promulgating regional air
quality plans. The states can define and exclude particular "uses"
and can determine on an ad hoc basis whether the likelihood of
detriment to such uses warrants a regional air quality plan.
States also have broad discretion to define the geographic
areas to which the plans apply-the so-called "investigation ar-
eas."5 6 Although the States' Commission for Immission Control
promulgated criteria for the definition of investigation areas in
1974, those criteria are not legally binding upon the states.57
States can legally define "regions" for the purpose of air quality
planning as they desire, even if their definitions make little
sense.
Moreover, states may decide to promulgate regional air qual-
ity plans only for "certain polluting materials, [for] certain parts
of an investigation area, and [for] certain kinds of immission
sources."58 This provision weakens the legally binding force of
"investigation areas" for defining the geographical scope of re-
gional air quality plans. At the same time, the provision allows
states to eschew a comprehensive regional air quality plan by
allowing states to limit the plan to "certain polluting materials"
and "certain kinds of immission sources." In this respect, too,
states have nearly total discretion in promulgating regional air
quality plans.
The Federal Immission Control Act does provide a rough,
and equally discretionary, description of the contents of regional
air quality plans. Regional Air Quality Plans are supposed to
contain: (1) "a description of the established emissions and
immissions59 of all or certain air pollutants"; (2) "data on the es-
tablished effects on the protected interests and assets referred to
in Article 1"; (3) "determinations regarding the causes of the air
BImSchG § 47(1) (Emphasis added).
BImSchG § 44.
Engelhardt, Kommentar at 192-93 (cited in note 49).
BImSchG § 47(1).
'9 The Federal Immission Control Act (like the United States Clean Air Act) distin-
guishes between "emissions"--releases of air pollutants from facilities--and
'immissions"-ambient air quality levels. BImSchG § 3(2)-(3).
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pollution and its effects"; (4) "a statement of the maximum
immission levels and model immission levels referred to in para-
graph (1) above, as well as any proposed uses [of the area]"; and
(5) "the measures to be undertaken to reduce and prevent air
pollution.' ° This list of criteria for the content of regional air
quality plans is highly general and demands little rigor in either
data collection or prescriptive solutions.
2. Making Ambient Air Quality Maintenance Plans binding.
By themselves, the Ambient Air Quality Maintenance Plans
adopted pursuant to Article 47 of the Federal Immission Control
Act are binding upon no one, not even upon the state agencies
that promulgate them. To make the plans legally binding, the
states must incorporate the operative provisions into a regulation
binding third parties (including state agencies generally), or an
administrative regulation that binds only the state environmen-
tal agency in charge of implementing pursuant to Article 49 of
the Act."' Without an accompanying regulation binding third
parties or an administrative regulation, an Ambient Air Quality
Maintenance Plan is nothing more than a suggestion. The states
themselves provide for such regulations according to their own
laws, and can determine the scope of measures and the form of
regulation. 2 One must look to the state regulations themselves,
therefore, to determine the extent to which Ambient Air Quality
Maintenance Plans are legally binding upon state administrative
agencies.
3. Federal supervision of states in regional air quality
planning.
Theoretically, federal administrative agencies charged with
environmental protection or the legislative branch of the federal
government-Bundestag or Bundesrat 3 -might be able to force
state agencies into compliance. The federal government possesses
several means to force the states to put in place regional air
BImSchG § 47(2).
61 BImSchG § 47(3). See also Engelhardt, Kommentar at 202 (cited in note 49). As of
1993, only North-Rhine-Westphalia had adopted an administrative order empowering the
state government to declare binding the measures proposed in regional air quality plans.
62 Engelhardt, Kommentar at 202-03 (cited in note 49) (describing the state-law provi-
sions in Bavaria and North-Rhine-Westphalia for making Ambient Air Quality Mainte-
nance Plans legally binding); Jarass, Kommentar at 584-86 (cited in note 54).
6 These are the two chambers of the federal legislature in Germany, the former
directly elected by votes, the latter elected by the governments of the German states.
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quality maintenance plans. First, with the consent of the
Bundesrat, the Bundestag under Article 84(1) of the Basic Law"
may regulate the organization and procedures of state agencies
charged with executing federal laws.' Second, and also with the
consent of the Bundesrat, the Bundestag under Article 84(2) may
issue administrative regulations that specify in greater detail
how a federal law must be carried out, constraining the discre-
tion of the states in implementing the federal law." Third, the
federal government under Article 84(3) may exercise supervision
over the states in their execution of federal law, and for that
purpose may send observers to state agencies charged with exe-
cuting the particular federal laws in question. 7 Fourth, if the
state governments fail to enforce federal laws, the federal govern-
ment under Article 84(4) may receive a determination from the
Bundesrat that the states are in derogation of their duties."
Fifth, with Bundesrat consent, the federal government under
Article 84(5) may issue particular instructions to states on a
case-by-case basis to force state compliance.69 Finally, if "all else
fails," the federal government under Article 37 may take "other
'necessary measures'" to enforce compliance.7 °
It should be noted, however, that in the nearly 50-year histo-
ry of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Bundesrat has never
been asked to find a state in violation of its duty or to approve
coercive measures under Article 37.71 Moreover, the federal gov-
ernment usually lacks real enforcement authority and cannot
itself step into the role of the states if the states fail to fulfill
their statutory responsibilities.72
4. Judicial review of regional ambient air quality planning.
Even if solid legal duties and federal supervision bound
states to promulgate adequate regional air quality plans, the
nature of judicial review in Germany would act as a further bar-
rier to adequate regional air quality plans. At first glance, judi-
cial review in Germany would seem to provide the potential for
The Basic Law is the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.
David P. Currie, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany 67 (Chicago 1994)
("German Constitution').
66 Id.
67 Id.
" Id at 67-68.
6' Currie, German Constitution at 68 (cited in note 65).
70 Id.
71 Id.
71 Id at 8-9.
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significant oversight of federal and state agency actions. "Article
19(4) [of the German Basic Law] guarantees judicial review of
administrative action to anyone whose rights are infringed by
public authority."7' Moreover, Article 19(4) suggests that the
reviewing court should determine both the law and the facts de
novo.74 However, the foregoing provisions apply exclusively to
the protection of individual rights.7"
With regard to judicial review of agency action that affects
the general welfare, the German administrative courts have far
more limited powers of judicial oversight than federal courts in
the United States. As a general matter, the administrative court
system does not exist to hear challenges to the legality of federal
or state laws or of federal regulations and guidelines.78 Citizen
suits of the kind brought pursuant to the United States' Clean
Air Act are foreign to the German legal system as a whole and
German clean air law in particular.77
5. No provision for cross-jurisdictional externalities.
The Federal Immission Control Act, TA-Luft, and other ac-
companying federal administrative orders, in contrast to the
American Clean Air Act, make no provision for preventing inter-
state violations of regional air quality plans. Thus, they fail to
provide for the possibility of inter-jurisdictional conflicts with
regard to regional air pollution planning.
6. Lack of a coordinated agency approach air quality
planning.
The sources of German air quality planning are diffuse, and
are not centrally enforced. Numerous statutes exist that mandate
small-scale varieties of air quality planning across small geo-
graphic areas. As a result, coordination between statutes and
agencies is difficult. For example, geographically-specific, highly
complicated federal laws and administrative orders dealing with
housing construction, zoning, development planning, street traf-
fic, air traffic, industrial law, and restaurant law contain air
quality planning requirements in addition to those of the Federal
Immission Control Act. 7' This kind of legal regime makes coordi-
' Currie, German Constitution at 162 (cited in note 65).
74 Id.
" Susan Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy: the Limits of Public Law
in Germany and the United States 72 (Yale 1995).
76 Id at 12-13.
7 Id at 11.
78 See, for example, Hans Paul Prtbmm, Umweltschutzrecht: Eine systematische
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nated approaches more difficult because ambient air quality
planning must take into account a labyrinth of complex statutes
which also impose immission requirements.
III. EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REGIONAL AMBIENT AIR
QUALITY PLANNING IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
A. The Difficulty With Comparing Empirical Data on Ambient
Air Quality in the United States and Germany
A comparison of data on ambient air quality in the United
States and Germany might be an obvious place to begin an exam-
ination of the relative success of the United States and German
air quality maintenance regimes. In fact, however, several factors
detract from the usefulness of such a comparison. First, the dif-
ferences in the size of the United States and German population
and territory make comparison difficult. For example, the rela-
tive levels of sulfur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide in the two coun-
tries are reversed when immissions per capita are used as a
benchmark rather than immissions per square kilometer.79 But
even immissions per capita and immissions per square kilometer
tell us little, because what we really need to know is "a frequency
function of per capita exposures for each country recording the
proportion of the population exposed to different levels of ambi-
ent air quality. 80 Only such a statistic would accurately convey
the relative levels of ambient air pollution as they affect the
respective populations of the each country. No such comparable
statistics exist."'
Second, the historical timing of the enactment of air pollu-
tion control measures in the United States and Germany makes
comparison difficult. For example, the United States acted in
1990 to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from power plants and
other major sources," while Germany acted in 1983.' "Full im-
plementation will reduce the intercountry differences" by the
year 2000." Because the length of time pollution control mea-
Einfihrung 173.179 (Alfred Metzner Verlag 1989). See also Engelhardt, Kommentar at
220-221 (cited in note 49).
"' Susan Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy: the Limits of Public Law
in Germany and the United States 21-22 (Yale 1995).
'0 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id at 22.
Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy at 22 (cited in note 79).
Id.
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sures have been in force significantly affects present ambient air
quality, comparing ambient air quality in the United States and
Germany is unhelpful."
Third, Germany is more likely to suffer adverse effects from
the immissions of neighboring countries than is the United
States." This disparity makes it difficult to correlate the nature
of regional air quality planning in Germany with ambient air
quality levels there.87
Because empirical measures cannot accurately assess the
relative success of German and American regional air quality
planning regimes, we must look to more qualitative methods.
B. Assessing the Ambient Air Quality Planning of the United
States
1. The approval and implementation of inadequate SIPs.
When federal and state agencies fail to supervise the imple-
mentation of statewide air quality plans, those agencies leave
enforcement of the law to citizens, public interest groups, and
federal courts, all of which are ill-equipped for the task.
Citizens lack the ability to make complicated technical deter-
minations necessary to assess the adequacy of a state or federal
air pollution program." Furthermore, citizens do not possess the
kind of financial resources that would allow them to make reli-
able determinations. Moreover, even national environmental
organizations with substantial resources and expertise will not
detect every approval of inadequate SIPs, because ambient air
quality planning is primarily a state responsibility and involves
promulgating and implementing lengthy and technically compli-
cated SIPs in 50 separate jurisdictions.89 As a result, private
enforcement is inaccurate, leaving many violations of clean air
law undetected and exacerbating the problem of frivolous suits.
This situation necessarily leads to inefficient supervision of a
complicated legal regime and an inefficient use of judicial re-
sources. This inefficiency interferes with the ability of the feder-
al-state planning regime to effectively police itself.
Meanwhile, federal courts are similarly ill-equipped to en-
force the SIP-FIP provisions of the Clean Air Act. Federal courts
Id.
Id at 22-23.
Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy at 20-21 (cited in note 79).
See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc v EPA, 902 F2d 962 (DC Cir 1990).
See Part II.
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can use their power to review administrative action to order the
government to comply with the clean air laws.' ° For courts to
engage in such supervision, however, is not only a waste of scarce
judicial resources, but is also an arguably futile endeavor. Recal-
citrant agencies often cannot be made to comply, even under
court supervision. 1 As a result, the federal-state division of
powers and responsibilities for ambient air quality planning is
difficult to police.
2. The inevitability of the problem.
Arguably, however, the flaws in American regional air quali-
ty planning are inevitable. Citizens and environmentalist groups
attempting to enforce clean air law will inevitably confront com-
plicated technical questions. To analyze those questions, citizens
and environmentalist groups will require significant outlays of
financial resources and human capital. Greater administrative or
judicial oversight likewise fails to ensure full enforcement of
environmental laws. If we were to create a new government
agency or authorize more searching judicial review to supervise
environmental law enforcement, we would need to find a way of
supervising the new supervising body as well.
Still, the states may not be the best vehicles for regional air
quality planning. If policy were made in a political and legal vac-
uum (that is, without any other jurisdictional considerations
getting in the way), we might be able to design air quality control
regions that most nearly matched regional air quality concerns.
However, such regions are a political and administrative impossi-
bility.
3. The treatment of administrative orders and rules.
The treatment of administrative authority plays an impor-
tant role in the effectiveness of regional ambient air quality plan-
ning in the United States. The EPA's orders and rules regarding
SIPs, the PSD program, attainment and nonattainment areas,
and sanctions have the force of law. This fact, in large part, ac-
counts for the relatively smooth functioning of the federal-state
division of design, implementation, supervision, and coordination
of regional ambient air quality planning in the United States.
90 42 USC § 7604(a).
Courts often retain jurisdiction over a period of years while waiting for agencies to
comply. See, for example, Alaska Center for the Environment v Browner, 20 F3d 981 (9th
Cir 1994).
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It is well settled that administrative orders and rules are
legally binding and must be enforced by the federal courts.2
Therefore, the EPA may announce legally-binding rules and or-
ders. It can enforce those rules and orders by various sanctions
and by suits in federal court. As discussed in Part II.A.1, these
strong enforcement powers are an important element of the legal
regime for guaranteeing regional ambient air quality planning.
Without these powers, the EPA could not effectively oversee the
states in their duty to implement regional ambient air quality
planning in the federal system.
4. The results of American regional ambient air quality
planning.
All 50 states have operative SIPs or FIPs, and it is beyond
dispute that regional ambient air quality planning is occurring in
all 50, albeit imperfectly. Moreover, the federal government has
issued and enforced regulations that require attainment of air
quality standards and forbid significant deterioration, resulting
in undisputed reductions in ambient air quality violations.
C. Assessing the Regional Ambient Air Quality Planning of the
Federal Republic of Germany
It is not difficult to see the practical effect of the German
regime of ambient air quality planning. In Germany, regional air
quality planning never happens for all practical purposes. As
discussed in Part II.B, Germany places responsibility for regional
air quality planning in the hands of states, without at the same
time creating strict standards for compliance and placing supervi-
sory and enforcement powers in the hands of the federal govern-
ment. The result is straightforward: German states have not
implemented federally-mandated state air quality plans.
See Humphrey's Executor v United States, 295 US 602 (1935) (affirming adminis-
trative agencies' authority to exercise judicial and legislative authority); National Petro-
leum Refiners v FTC, 482 F2d 672 (DC Cir 1973) (upholding the right of administrative
agencies to make substantive agency policy through rule-making, even where the enabling
law is unclear with regard to that authority); SEC v Chenery Corp., 332 US 194 (1947)
(upholding administrative orders where a situation before an agency demonstrates facts
too specific to be dealt with by the drafting of a rule).
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1. The German states' failure to promulgate Ambient Air
Quality Maintenance Plans.
Since passage of the Federal Immission Control Act, the
German states have published Ambient Air Quality Maintenance
Plans that cover only 5,244 square kilometers of their 356,845
square kilometer territory, or a total of less than 1.5 percent of
the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany."3 Of sixteen
German states, only five have published Ambient Air Quality
Maintenance Plans, of which two are city-states of limited geo-
graphical scope-Hamburg and Berlin."
2. The limited scope of Germany's existing Ambient Air
Quality Maintenance Plans.
The Ambient Air Quality Maintenance Plans that do exist
are limited in various ways. Aside from the Plans published by
the city-states (which are of limited regional usefulness), the
three other German states have chosen to limit the scope of their
Ambient Air Quality Maintenance Plans geographically. Some
states have also limited the scope of their Ambient Air Quality
Maintenance Plan with respect to the range of pollutants includ-
ed.
The state of North-Rhine-Westphalia possesses the geograph-
ically largest Ambient Air Quality Maintenance Plan, covering
approximately 9.5 percent of its territory, exclusively focusing on
areas with highly concentrated industrial activity and high popu-
lation density. 5 The state of Rhineland-Pfalz possesses Air Quali-
ty Maintenance Plans for just over 1.1 percent of its territory.96
Finally, the state of Hessen has limited its Air Quality
Maintenance Plans to several areas totaling less than 3.0 percent
of its territory.97 Even among the few individual states that
have published them, therefore, existing Ambient Air Quality
" This statistic does not include Ambient Air Quality Plans that have been drafted,
but not adopted formally. See, for example, Siegfried Wurm, Informationen zum Stand der
gebietsbezogenen Luftreinhaleplanung der Bundeslinder, 11/12 Informationen zur
Raumentwicklung 1035, 1041 (1985) (listing several proposed Plans that have been
drafted or are "under development" but that have received no further attention and carry
no legal significance).
' Thomas W. Bilttner, Regional differenzierte Luftreinhalteregelungen im
anlagenbezogenen Immissionsschutzrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 66-70 (Peter
Lang 1992) ("Regional differenzierte Luftreinhalteregelungen") (claiming that German
states have developed no further Air Quality Maintenance Plans since that time).
Id.
Id.
9 Id at 66-70 (cited in note 94).
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Maintenance Plans cover only a highly circumscribed geographic-
al area.
In addition, most Air Quality Maintenance Plans do not
cover all the pollutants for which the Federal Immission Control
Law and the accompanying TA-Luft provide national ambient air
quality standards. The state of Berlin, for example, has only
published an Air Quality Maintenance Plan for sulfur dioxide,
although it has developed a plan covering a much broader range
of pollutants."
3. Absence of interstate coordination of ambient air quality
planning to deal with cross-jurisdictional externalities.
German clean air law makes no provision for coordinating
regional ambient air quality planning to deal effectively with
cross-jurisdictional externalities." German reunification exacer-
bated this failure. Reunification brought a number of new states
into the Federal Republic of Germany that had severe ambient
air quality problems."° The severity of the ambient air quality
problems of the new states can be seen from the volume and
content of the special legislation and regulation that apply to
these states alone. These special arrangements generally loosen
the requirements of environmental statutes in the interests of
promoting economic development. 1'
IV. A PARADIGM FOR FEDERALISM IN REGIONAL AMBIENT AIR
QUALITY PLANNING
In light of the German and American experiences with re-
gional ambient air quality planning, important limitations of
federalism emerge. While some limitations are endemic to any
federal system, others follow from the particular system a nation
employs. This is especially true of regional air quality planning.
BUttner, Regional differenzierte Luftreinhalteregelungen at 66-70 (cited in note 94).
See Part II.
See, for example, Rose-Ackerman, Controlling Environmental Policy at 22, 153 n 1
(cited in note 79).
1 See, for example, Michael Kloepfer, Das Umweltrecht in der deutschen Einigung.
Zum Umweltrecht im Einigungsvertrag und zum Umweltrahmengesetz 69-122 (Duncker &
Humboldt 1991).
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A. The Federal Role
1. Setting national standards for ambient air quality.
The German experience with the dearth of regional planning
demonstrates that the federal government cannot simply set
national standards for ambient air quality to be implemented at
the state level. In Germany, an administrative regulation---called
the TA-Luft-sets national standards and demands that they be
met through regional ambient air quality planning, among other
means. But despite these federally-imposed standards, virtually
no regional ambient air quality planning occurs in Germany.
That is not to say that national ambient air quality stan-
dards are not useful. They are. In the United States, they form
the bases around which states design their Implementation
Plans. Some minimum standards are necessary to ensure that a
baseline for ambient air quality exists beyond which states may
not allow pollution. But the German experience demonstrates
that national ambient air quality standards alone will not ensure
that regional ambient air quality planning occurs.
2. The role of federal and private supervision and
enforcement.
Germany lacks federal enforcement of national ambient air
quality standards. The United States' National Ambient Air
Quality Standards ("NAAQSs") possess substantial force in state-
wide ambient air quality planning because the EPA, as well as
citizens and environmental organizations, have significant ad-
ministrative and judicial sanctions at their disposal to enforce
the standards. That is not the case in Germany, in part because
of the generally weaker federal enforcement role in joint federal-
state tasks like air pollution control, and in part because the
system of judicial review of administrative action was not de-
signed for citizen suits. An effective regional air quality scheme
demands federal involvement in administrative enforcement and
third party access to judicial review of administrative action.
3. The role of the federal government in coordinating
regional ambient air quality planning.
Based on the need for regional air quality planning and the
historical failure of states to accomplish such regional planning
when left to their own devices, federal involvement is also called
for in dealing with cross-jurisdictional air pollution. Federal coor-
dination of statewide ambient air quality planning addresses
cross-jurisdictional externalities, while preserving the advantages
CLEAN AIR LAW IN THE U.S. AND GERMANY
states have in determining and addressing their own ambient air
quality problems. This coordination is not regional planning per
se, but rather statewide planning with federal coordination.
These, then, are the limits to devolution of which New Federal-
ists should be aware.
B. The Role of the States
Beyond the powers enumerated above, which are properly
placed in the hands of the federal government, the states should
be free to maneuver as they choose with respect to regional ambi-
ent air quality planning. They should design their own statewide
ambient air quality planning regimes, provided that the plans
comply with broad federal requirements. Once the essential pow-
ers of the federal government are outlined, all else may reason-
ably be placed squarely into the able hands of the states, which
have superior knowledge of local conditions and an incentive to
innovate.
C. The Limitations of Federalism in the United States and
Germany
For Germany, the experience of the United States demon-
strates that no system of regional air quality planning can
achieve perfection. Nevertheless, the American experience dem-
onstrates the possibilities of effective pollution control within a
framework of considerable state autonomy. Problems of federal-
ism inevitably arise due to the difficulty of coordinating between
governmental levels and jurisdictions. These problems will not
disappear. They constitute fundamental imperfections of all fed-
eral systems.
At the same time, however, neither of the alternatives for
regional ambient air quality planning---centralization or devolu-
tion-will likely work very well. Centralizing ambient air quality
planning in the hands of the federal government, in addition to
being politically infeasible, would be costly, make regional plan-
ning less effective, and frustrate self-determination and experi-
mentation by states. Further devolution of discretionary powers
to the states, on the other hand, poses the danger of a "race-to-
the-bottom" in regional ambient air quality planning. The Ger-
man experience demonstrates that states will not engage in effec-
tive regional air quality planning without the federal government
exerting pressure upon them to do so. In practice, a lack of feder-
al supervision, coordination, and enforcement of regional ambient
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air quality planning results in too much state discretion and
provides a recipe for a "race-to-the-bottom."
The United' States already has a system of statewide air
quality planning that ensures sufficient state autonomy to deal
effectively with local air pollution problems. At the same time,
the United States' clean air law ensures that regional air quality
plans meet minimum standards for effectiveness. The law pro-
vides flexibility, treating regions with different levels of ambient
air quality differently so that all regions will not fall to the same
low standard. The United States' clean air law assures that coor-
dination between states will occur, addressing the problem of
cross-jurisdictional externalities and ensuring inter-jurisdictional
air quality.
The problem of proving causation and the difficulties with
comparing ambient air quality between the United States and
Germany make it impossible to claim that ambient air quality in
the United States has improved more than in Germany as the
result of United States regional air quality planning. It is clear,
however, that the United States' regional air quality regime does
a better job than the German regime with respect to the division
of federal-state responsibilities. In contrast to the German modsl,
all 50 states possess SIPs, and federal enforcement and coordina-
tion of SIPs occurs.
CONCLUSION
The practical limitations to the devolution envisioned by New
Federalism should be recognized and respected. Further devolu-
tion would likely lead to a race-to-the-bottom in regional ambient
air quality planning. The United States should not abandon the
basic federalist balance of the Clean Air Act in favor of a system
in which greater powers are placed in the hands of states. In so
arguing, this Comment attempts to substitute sober lessons
gleaned from another country's experience for the romanticism of
an as yet untried and untested theory of devolution. In the field
of clean air law, the quest for the perfect may indeed prove the
mortal enemy of the good.
